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What England can expect from Switzerland – analyzing their four tactical characteristics

It turns out that Murat Yakin wasn’t lying in 2022. He was just one tournament early.

“I think we are the best Swiss national team there has ever been,” said their coach before the World Cup. He promised the Swiss team’s best result at an international tournament, but did not keep it – Portugal beat them 6-1 in the round of 16.

From heartbreak to broken records: 18 months later, Switzerland knocked out European champions Italy in the round of 16 of Euro 2024. It was only their second knockout victory at a major tournament and their first in regular time (at Euro 2020 they beat France on penalties in the round of 16). It was also their first knockout game at a major tournament without Xherdan Shaqiri in the starting line-up since the 2006 World Cup.

Shaqiri was the team’s flagship for a decade, always emerging on the international stage and scoring the goals of the tournament. Switzerland have qualified for the group stage at every tournament since the 2014 World Cup, but have lost five of their six round of 16 matches.

There was little to suggest in qualifying that this time would be any different and Yakin was lucky to still be in that position. Switzerland drew five of their ten matches and dropped points through late goals, finishing second behind Romania. Yakin admitted they had to “try a few things”. There were open discussions with captain Granit Xhaka and Yakin changed the formation from 4-2-3-1 to 3-4-3.

If national football teams reflect their society, then it is logical that Switzerland, a multicultural, multiethnic and multilingual country, has so many different tactical components. “We don’t want to change our approach,” Yakin said before the match against Italy. “We have managed so far with our intensity, a solid defense, this formation and our quick counterattacks.”

As England face Switzerland in the quarter-finals on Saturday, it is time to analyse these four elements.

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Switzerland’s man-to-man pressing cornered Italy – after 25 minutes, Switzerland had 54 passes in the final third to Italy’s six. Their 3-4-3 formation accommodated Italy’s 4-3-3 pressing, although Yakin’s side benefitted from forced substitutions in Italy, with Riccardo Calafiori (suspended) and Federico Dimarco (injured) replaced by Gianluca Mancini and Matteo Darmian (a right-footed left-back) respectively.

Italy always tended to put pressure on the right side when building up play, but Switzerland was as aggressive as it was coordinated in its pressing.

They set a clever trap by initially leaving right-back Giovanni Di Lorenzo unmarked and standing much closer around Italy’s left-back (Darmian) and left winger (Stephan El Shaarawy). When Gianluigi Donnarumma played the ball to right-back Mancini, they pounced.

The defender on the other side of Switzerland (either their full-back or number 10) was switched on and ran towards Italy’s midfielder furthest from the ball. This ensured that Italy’s central options were covered, leaving open the big transition pass to the winger or full-back. In theory, Italy had a three-on-three situation on the halfway line that could be exploited with direct play. However, their wingers held the width, leaving number 9 Gianluca Scamacca outnumbered. Despite his height (1.95m), he is not a great aerial duellist.

Di Lorenzo was often boxed in – he had the least passing accuracy of the Italian back four. The first half was dominated by a sequence in the 41st minute when Switzerland switched from a 5-4-1 middle block to a man-to-man high press. Donnarumma played on the right, the Swiss left side jumped and Di Lorenzo slipped, injured himself and caused a throw-in. The ball rolled into Yakin’s coaching zone. He won the tactical battle.

“I knew that if the Italians played with a back four, we would destroy them,” said Yakin. “Then we let them run. Dan (Ndoye) closed down the midfield. El Shaarawy hardly saw a ball.”


Defenses are known to win championships. Switzerland have lost just one of 18 games since the start of 2023, 0-1 against Romania in qualifying. Yakin built this team on a strong defense – they conceded just two goals in eight games in qualifying for the 2022 World Cup.

Italy only had one shot on goal on Saturday: in the 72nd minute. The closest to scoring was Fabian Schar, who headed a cross onto his own post.

With a back three, Switzerland defend in a structurally strong 5-4-1. The win against Italy was their first clean sheet of the tournament, but they never conceded more than one goal in the group stage. They lost by two headers (against Germany and Hungary) and a deflected shot (against Scotland). This speaks to the experience of individual players and teams.

The backbone of Switzerland is formed by the 2023/24 title winners: goalkeeper Yann Sommer (Inter Milan, Serie A), central defender Manuel Akanji (Manchester City, Premier League) and Xhaka (Bayer Leverkusen, Bundesliga). Yakin’s three-man chain with Ricardo Rodriguez, Akanji and Schar is set, as is the midfield rotation with Xhaka and Remo Freuler.

Including Sommer, these six core players have a total of 558 appearances – Italy’s starting eleven, by comparison, made 389 – and seven of the starting eleven’s players are the same as the team that lost to Italy in the group stage of Euro 2020.


Especially in Shaqiri’s absence, Switzerland’s form has been the sum of its parts rather than that of a superstar. Their seven goals have all been scored by a different scorer: the highest number at a European Championship (excluding replays) since Portugal 2008.

Switzerland are being compared to several club teams. Their central passing combinations, third-man runs and No.10s pushing into the box, all of which led to their two goals against Italy, are reminiscent of Xhaka’s Leverkusen. A flexible attacking style that sometimes goes short and through the midfield, sometimes plays directly to the strikers and switches, is reminiscent of Sommer’s Inter.

Their rotation of full-backs, particularly Michel Aebischer on the left, who alternates between holding the width and moving into the middle to become an additional number 8 in attack, is a trademark of Thiago Motta’s Bologna, where Aebischer and Dan Ndoye (a full-back/number 10 for Yakin) play.

Switzerland’s opening match against Italy capped off a 31-pass sequence. It showed how much the teams struggled with their rotations on the left, as Italy’s central midfielders were packed tight, leaving space for No.9 Breel Embolo to drop back. Akanji split the midfield with a pass into his feet that Embolo fed to No.10 Ndoye. Switzerland are excellent at getting midfield runners behind the ball, which was evident when Ndoye passed his pass wide to Ruben Vargas. Embolo hit the far post.

This forced Italy’s back four into their own penalty area and Freuler attacked the space around the penalty spot and scored with two touches following Vargas’ pass.

There is a simple but unfair explanation that the Round of 16 match showed Italy’s problems rather than Switzerland’s quality. After all, it was the fourth game of the tournament in which Italy had conceded the first goal. Despite this, Switzerland scored the first goal three times and this was their second goal to take the lead after a flowing passing move.

Kwadwo Duah’s goal on the opening day against Hungary came after a 22-pass sequence. Switzerland played patiently around the opponent’s 5-4-1 block before working their way back into a central position. Hungary’s midfielders failed to recover. This time it was Akanji who found Aebischer, whose through ball sent Duah (on his international debut) on goal. Hungary’s head coach Marco Rossi spoke afterwards of a “tactical misunderstanding”.

Yakin has his midfielders attack with opposite movements: when one drops inside, the other runs back. When a full-back comes inside, the number 10 moves outside.

This was evident in the second goal against Italy. A triangle on the left consisting of Aebischer, Vargas (No. 10) and Xhaka exchanged passes. Italy had three defenders on the field but could not follow Vargas’ run from the wing behind Xhaka. He hit the top corner and Italy botched the kick-off, but it was another clever Swiss move.

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Switzerland did not have to prove its counterattack strength in the round of 16.

“We not only defended as a unit and sat back, we also showed that we can attack and dominate the action,” said Yakin. Immediately after their two goals, Switzerland switched to a 5-4-1 midfield. Their hybrid approach to losing the ball was typical of the Premier League’s top teams, a mix of midfield defense and high man-to-man pressing.

In the last group match against Germany, Switzerland defended similarly – 5-4-1 middle block, high pressing man against man.

Their 5-4-1 middle block is perfect for counterattacks, with wingers and number 10s able to combine and play free. Transitional attacks suit Embolo’s abilities, as the 27-year-old has the acceleration and top speed to chase angled balls and the technical quality to receive passes under pressure or dribble himself.

At Euro 2020 and Euro 2024, only three teams (Denmark, Germany and, ironically, Italy) can beat Switzerland’s 25 direct attacks, which Opta defines as possession that begins in a team’s own half with at least 50 percent forward movement and ends with a shot/touch in the opposition’s penalty area.


After the match, Yakin did not make any big predictions or promises. He enjoyed the victory without forgetting to stay grounded.

His team has been praised for “doing things right. We’ve earned the right to be here but we’re not done yet,” he said. This could end up being Switzerland’s Golden Generation. England, watch out.

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